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Abstract
This paper estimates intergenerational elasticities across three generations in the United
States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, exploring how maternal and paternal grand-
fathers predict the economic status of their grandsons and granddaughters. We document
that the relationship between the income of grandparents and grandchildren differs by gen-
der. The socio-economic status of grandsons is more strongly associated with the status
of paternal grandfathers than maternal grandfathers. Conversely, the status of maternal
grandfathers is more strongly correlated with the status of granddaughters than grand-
sons, while the opposite is true for paternal grandfathers. We argue that the findings can
be rationalized by a model of gender-specific intergenerational transmission of traits and
imperfect assortative mating.
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1 Introduction
The dramatic increase in income inequality over the past four decades has led to a renewed
interest in how economic status is transmitted across generations. A high degree of inequality
that persists across generations undermines the very notion of equality of opportunity. The
availability of large administrative datasets has pushed the envelope of research on intergen-
erational mobility, allowing scholars to explore in more detail the nature of the transmission
mechanism across generations and how it has evolved over time (see for example Chetty et
al., 2014b; Hilger 2016). One of the most interesting recent developments is the study of the
transmission of economic status across multiple generations (Solon 2014 , Mare 2011, Zeng and
Xie 2014). This extends a large literature that examines intergenerational mobility across two
generations, typically focusing on fathers and sons (see Solon, 1999 and Black and Devereux,
2011 for extensive surveys).
In this paper, we estimate intergenerational elasticities across three generations in the
United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, extending the methodology orig-
inally developed by Olivetti and Paserman (2015), which exploits the socioeconomic content
of first names. Our main contribution is the historical analysis of the correlations between
the socioeconomic status of both maternal and paternal grandparents and that of both grand-
daughters and grandsons. The analysis of gender differences in the process of intergenerational
transmission is challenging in the U.S. before 1940 because of the difficulty in tracking women
who change their last name upon marriage.1 Our approach allows us to measure the rela-
tionship between grandchildren and grandparents across all possible gender lines, document
gender differences in the strength of these correlations, and explore potential reasons for these
patterns.
Although there is a rapidly expanding literature that studies multigenerational mobility
with modern data (see references below), it is valuable to study an historical period in which
1An analysis of gender differences in the process of intergenerational transmission is only possible with
information on the socioeconomic status of both mothers and fathers. It is only recently that married women
have participated in the labor force in large numbers; thus, it is difficult to observe the socioeconomic status of
married women separately from their husbands in historical data (the census does not collect information about
educational attainment until 1940). The only way to achieve this is to observe the socioeconomic status of the
parents of married men and women. As such, even if transmission only occurs over two generations, gender
differences in long-run mobility are difficult to document without data spanning at least three generations.
This limitation, of course, does not apply to modern data; see Chadwick and Solon (2002) and Hellerstein and
Morrill (2011).
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the role of grandparents was very different from what it is today (Falk and Falk, 2002). On
the one hand, lower life expectancy would imply that most grandchildren had little direct
contact with their grandparents. On the other hand, living arrangements in farms and the
absence of old-age government support meant that grandparents were more likely to live in the
same household as their adult children and grandchildren. It is also worthwhile to investigate
specifically the role of grandmothers during this period and, in particular, the value of traits
and skills transmitted to their female descendants in a society in which married women would
typically not work.
We sometimes refer loosely to our estimates as the “effect of grandparents,” but we stress
that we do not interpret these relationships as causal. In particular, we are unable to distin-
guish between direct and indirect grandparental effects. In other words, our methodology does
not allow us to take a strong stance on whether grandparents “matter” because they directly
invest in grandchildren, because they induce the middle generation to invest more, or merely
because they correct a downward bias inherent in estimates of two-generation persistence.
The key insight behind our methodological approach is that the information about socio-
economic status conveyed by first names can be used to create pseudo-links between grandfa-
thers (G1), fathers (G2) and grandchildren (G3). Specifically, the empirical strategy amounts
to imputing father’s income,2 which is unobserved, using the average income of fathers of
children with a given first name. Extending this idea, one can also impute grandfather’s in-
come as a weighted average of the name-specific average income of the fathers’ fathers, with
weights equal to the fraction of fathers with each name among all the fathers of G3 children
with a given first name. For example, if half of the fathers of children named “John” in 1880
are named “Adam,” and the other half are named “Bob,” the income of the grandfather of
“John” would be imputed as the simple average of the average income of fathers of “Adam”
and the average income of fathers of “Bob” in 1860.3
The intuition for why this methodology works can be explained using a simple example.
Assume that the only possible names for boys in generation G3 are Adam and Zachary, with
2To be precise, the data only allows us to calculate the intergenerational elasticity in an index of occupational
status based on the 1950 income distribution. Somewhat loosely, we will sometimes refer to our estimates as
estimates of the intergenerational income elasticity, or simply intergenerational elasticity.
3Note that the grandfather’s name (G1’s name) plays no role in the estimation. We will return to this
point when discussing whether our results can be affected by the custom of naming grandchildren after one’s
grandparents.
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high socioeconomic status G2 parents more likely to name their child Adam, and Zachary being
more common among low socioeconomic status parents. In a society with a high degree of
intergenerational mobility, we would not expect the adult Adams to have much of an advantage
over the adult Zacharys. Moreover, in the previous generation (G1) the fathers of men who
name their sons Adam should be almost indistinguishable from the fathers of men who name
their sons Zachary. On the other hand, in a more rigid society, the adult Adams grow to be
richer than the adult Zacharys, and the G1 fathers of men who name theirs sons Adam are
expected to be richer. Therefore, one can obtain a good measure of intergenerational mobility
by correlating the average incomes of people with a given name, that of fathers of people with
that name, and that of fathers of fathers who assign that name. A distinct advantage of our
approach is that it allows us to measure the importance of maternal grandparents as well as
paternal grandparents. Our methodology applies equally well to women: just replace Adam
and Zachary in the previous example with Abigail and Zoe¨, and use husband’s income as the
measure of women’s socioeconomic status.
Olivetti and Paserman (2015) use this methodology to provide the first estimate of intergen-
erational mobility between fathers and daughters in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In
the case of three generations, the methodology allows us to estimate four different channels of
intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic status: fathers-sons-grandsons, fathers-sons-
granddaughters, fathers-daughters-grandsons and fathers-daughters-granddaughters. More-
over, we are able to model intergenerational income transmission by including the income of
both paternal and maternal grandparents in the same regression. Even though our method-
ology does not necessarily recover the intergenerational elasticity estimates that would be
obtained with a true intergenerationally linked data set, it is still able to provide comparable
estimates of long-run mobility across all the possible gender lines. Thus, we can analyze the
relative importance of paternal and maternal grandparents and potentially uncover different
mechanisms through which gender differentials in intergenerational mobility may arise.
Using 1% extracts from the Decennial Censuses of the United States between 1850 and
1940, we find evidence that, even after controlling for the income of generation G2 (“father’s
income”), the income of generation G1 (“grandfather’s income”) is strongly correlated with
the income of generation G3 (“grandchild’s income”).4 This finding is consistent with pre-
4Our analysis ends in 1940 because census data that includes first names is released to the public with a 70
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vious studies; however, as Solon (2015), Braun and Stuhler (2016) and Ferrie et al. (2016)
correctly observe, it does not necessarily imply a causal effect of grandparents, especially when
socioeconomic status is measured with error. As for the distinctive feature of our analysis, i.e.,
the ability to distinguish between the effect of paternal and maternal grandparents, we find
interesting gender differentials in the strength of the correlation between the three generations.
Our results indicate that the transmission of economic status occurs mostly along gendered
lines. That is, paternal grandfathers matter more than maternal grandfathers for the income
of grandsons, while the opposite is true for granddaughters. Furthermore, holding the gender
of the second generation constant, we find that maternal grandfathers are more important for
granddaughters than for grandsons, while the opposite is true for paternal grandfathers.5 The
differential effects of maternal and paternal grandparents on grandsons and granddaughters
are difficult to reconcile with a simple measurement-error based explanation of the grandpar-
ent coefficient, unless one assumes that the type of measurement error differs by gender. We
will return to this point in Section 3.
Why is the multigenerational transmission of economic status asymmetric with respect
to gender? A plausible explanation is that traits determining desirability in the marriage
market are inherited along gendered lines. This would predict that men are more similar
to their paternal grandfathers and women to their maternal grandmothers. However, with
perfect assortative mating, this is not sufficient to generate the gendered pattern of correla-
tions that we observe. To see this, suppose we can classify men and women as “high” and
“low” types. Under perfect assortative mating, “high type” sons always marry “high type”
daughters, and their children are in turn “high types,” irrespective of gender. The correlation
between grandchildren and their maternal and paternal grandfathers is then identical. More-
over, the correlation between grandfathers and grandchildren of either gender is also identical.
year lag.
5There are relatively few studies that look at gender differentials in the link between grandparents and
grandchildren. One notable exception is Duflo (2003), who studies the extension of pension benefits to black
South-Africans in the 1990s. She shows that pensions received by grandmothers, particularly maternal grand-
mothers, had a large impact on the anthropometric status of granddaughters, but little effect on that of
grandsons. In contrast, no similar effect is found for pensions received by grandfathers. Vidal-Fernandez
and Posadas (2013) provide evidence that by providing childcare services, maternal grandmothers may have
a positive (causal) impact on the labor supply of their daughters. In the sociology literature, Modin, Erikson
and Vagero (2013) find that grandmothers are more important for the transmission of linguistic abilities to
granddaughters. Celhay and Gallegos (2015) find that having more educated grandmothers matters more for
women.
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Therefore, assortativeness in the marriage market must be less than perfect in order for this
mechanism to explain our findings. With imperfect sorting, the correlation between grandfa-
thers and grandsons will be stronger along the paternal line than the maternal line: a “high
type” grandfather will have a “high type” son, whose son will in turn be a “high type.” His
daughter, however, will not necessarily marry a “high type” man; therefore, she could have a
son of either type. A similar argument applies in reverse to granddaughters and maternal and
paternal grandmothers.
One way of introducing imperfect sorting in the marriage market is to assume that indi-
viduals have multiple traits, which are valued differently by men and women. We can think
of these as a “market” trait, which is more important in determining men’s value in the mar-
riage market, and a “nonmarket” trait, which is more important for women. In fact, we find
interesting regional patterns of correlations between grandchildren and maternal and paternal
grandfathers, which are consistent with the notion of multiple traits that are valued asymmet-
rically in the marriage market. Specifically, the paternal line is dominant in the Northeast,
while the maternal line is dominant in the South. Our interpretation is that market traits,
which are more important for men in the marriage market, were more persistent in the North-
east. This is reasonable for the period under analysis: the South was in the middle of its
structural transformation from an agricultural to an industrial economy, and any transmis-
sion of occupation or industry-specific human capital from fathers to sons was likely weaker.
On the other hand, traditional gender norms were more prevalent in the South. Non-market
traits such as nurturing, household management and spousal loyalty were highly valued and
likely to be strongly transmitted from mother to daughter.
A handful of studies have studied multigenerational persistence of economic status using
historical data.6 Ferrie and Long (2017) measure occupational mobility across three gener-
ations by tracing men through national censuses from 1850 to 1910 in the UK and the US.
Clark (2014) examines intergenerational mobility over the very long term by tracing the per-
formance of men with particular surname characteristics over time. These studies tend to
find evidence of significant multigenerational effects along the male line.7 Braun and Stuhler
6Other studies have looked at paternal and maternal grandparental effects using modern data. See, for
example, Warren and Hauser (1997) and Kroeger and Thompson (2016).
7Both studies focus on men. This is because surnames are used in some capacity to trace families over time
but women change their last name upon marriage.
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(2016) analyze maternal and paternal grandparents. They observe educational attainment
and occupational status for a set of German matrilineal and patrilineal lineages spanning the
19th and 20th Centuries; they find evidence of a positive grandparent effect, both maternal
and paternal, but caution against a causal interpretation of these findings, as the effect tends
to vanish statistically with the inclusion of certain characteristics of the middle generation.
For the U.S., Ferrie, Massey and Rothbaum (2016) create a four-generation sample centered in
1940 and spanning the twentieth century, in which families are linked along both the maternal
and the paternal line. They find evidence of a positive grandparent effect on grandchildren’s
education but argue that this may also be consistent with a two-generation model with clas-
sical measurement error in the reporting of educational attainment. Neither of these studies
directly addresses whether maternal and paternal grandparents have differential effects on
their grandchildren.8 For Sweden, Dribe and Helgertz (2016) study the effect of grandparents
on their grandsons’ (but not granddaughters’) economic status, showing that paternal grand-
fathers have a greater effect than maternal grandfathers. Lindahl et al. (2015) find that the
intergenerational correlation in educational attainment of grandchildren does not depend on
their own gender or that of their grandparents, but the paper is silent about any difference
between maternal and paternal grandparents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the methodology
as well as the data used for the analysis and some measurement issues. The main results
and some robustness checks are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses several possible
interpretations for our findings. Section 5 discusses regional differences in the transmission of
economic status across generations, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology and Data
Consider an individual i belonging to G3 who is a child at time t − s and adult at time t
(in practice, we will look at generations separated by 20 or 30 years). Let yit be individual
i’s log earnings at time t, yit−s be his father’s (G2) log earnings at time t − s, and yit−2s be
his father’s father’s log-earnings (G1) at t− 2s. With individually linked data, yit, yit−s and
8Braun and Stuhler cannot include both grandparents in the regression, because the data is obtained by
sampling the middle generation, so only one line of the family is ever observed. Ferrie et al., on the other hand,
only include the grandparent or great-grandparent with the highest level of educational attainment, irrespective
of gender. Maternal and paternal grandparents are never entered simultaneously in the regressions.
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yit−2s are all observed, and the intergenerational elasticity estimate is obtained by regressing
yit on yit−s and yit−2s.
Assume instead that we only observe three separate cross-sections, and it is impossible to
link individuals across the three. This means that both yit−s and yit−2s are unobserved, and it
becomes necessary to impute them. Our strategy is to base the imputation on an individual’s
first name, which is available for both adults and children in each cross-section.9
Linking generation G2 to generation G3
To link individuals from generations G2 and G3, we follow the same approach used in Olivetti
and Paserman (2015). For a G3 adult at time t named j, we replace yit−s with y˜′jt−s, the
average log earnings of G2 fathers of children named j, obtained from the time t − s cross
section (the “prime” indicates that this average is calculated using a different sample). We
restrict the sample of G2 fathers to be in the same age range as the sample of G3 adults; this
is to facilitate our links to G1, which will be explained in the following subsection.
This methodology amounts to creating a “generated regressor” by using one sample to
create a proxy for an unobserved regressor in a second sample.10 A key requirement of this
methodology is that first names carry information about socioeconomic status, or alternatively,
that names are not distributed randomly in the population.11 This ensures that the average
income of fathers of children with a given first name is a reasonable proxy for the fathers’
actual income. Otherwise the generated regressor would be just noise and our estimator
would converge to zero.12
9There has been a flurry of recent research that uses the informative content of surnames to obtain estimates
of social mobility across generation. See Gu¨ell, Rodr´ıguez-Mora and Telmer (2015), Collado, Ortun˜o Ort´ın and
Romeu (2012) and Clark (2014). Our study differs in that we exploit the informative content of first names.
10Note that there is a trade-off in imputing income. On the one hand, using finer cells to impute father’s
income (such as last names, or first names by state of birth) can achieve higher precision in the imputed values.
On the other hand, it might reduce the cell size used to compute the average and exacerbate measurement
error.
11The empirical evidence strongly supports the assumption that parents choose first names partly to signal
their own standing in society, or their cultural and religious beliefs (see, for example, Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan, 2004, and Fryer and Levitt, 2004).
12See Olivetti and Paserman (2015) for a more detailed discussion of the econometric properties of this
estimator.
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Linking generation G1 to generation G3
Adding a link to generation G1 is slightly more complicated. We would like to impute G1’s
income to a G3 adult named j as the average income of the grandfathers of children named j in
year t−2s. However, two difficulties arise: first, G3 adults in year t would not have been born
in year t−2s, so it is impossible to make a “direct” pseudo-link to year t−2s. Second, making
“direct” pseudo-links from G1 to G3 would require households to be multigenerational, i.e.
containing children and grandfathers residing together, which was not typically the case.
However, we can still apply the same principle used for the G2-G3 link, extended to an
additional generation. For example, suppose that children named Adam in year t − 20 have
fathers named David, Edward and Fred, in equal proportions. The income assigned to G1
for the group of G3 adults named “Adam” is the weighted average, with weights 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 , of
the average income at time t − 40 of all fathers of children named David, Edward and Fred,
respectively.
Formally, we proceed as follows. First, we calculate q′j,k as the fraction of fathers (G2)
named k of children (G3) named j. This value is taken from Census year t − s, in which
G2 individuals are adults, and G3 children still live at home with their parents. Second, we
calculate y˜′′k,t−2s, the average log earnings of G1 fathers of children named k (this average is
calculated from Census year t−2s and we use the “double-prime” to indicate that this average
is calculated using yet a different sample). Finally, we calculate the average log earnings of
the grandfathers of G3 adults named j as:
y˜′′j,2t−s =
∑
k
q′j,ky˜
′′
k,t−2s
In other words, y˜′′j,t−2s is a weighted average of the name-specific average log earnings of the
fathers of G2 fathers, with the weights equal to the fraction of G2 individuals with that name
among all the fathers of G3 children named j.
One can then obtain an estimate of the income elasticity across the three generations by
running a regression of yi,t on y˜
′
j,t−s and y˜
′′
j,t−2s. This regression is run at the individual G3
level, with all G3 adults with the same first name having identical imputed incomes of G2 and
G1.13 Note that G2 income is proxied by G3 names, while G1 income is proxied by G2 names.
13It can be shown that this estimator can be written as a special case of a “two-sample two-stage least
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The estimator does not depend at all on the names in the grandparents’ (G1) generation.
The validity of the estimator depends on the ability of first names to explain variation in
economic status. Olivetti and Paserman (2015) show that first names explain approximately
11 to 17% of the variation in occupational income between 1850 and 1940. This somewhat
overstates the degree to which names explain economic status. Because there are many names
that occur only once in the data, first names would explain some amount of variation in income
even if names had no economic content. Still, Olivetti and Paserman (2015) show that the
amount of variation in income truly explained by first names is greater than zero.
How does this estimator compare to the one based on individually linked data? As shown
in Olivetti and Paserman (2015) its difference relative to the standard estimator can be de-
composed into three parts.
The first component is the traditional attenuation bias deriving from the fact that we
replace true father’s and grandfather’s income with an imputed value, thus introducing mea-
surement error. The three-generation case includes an additional source of measurement error
stemming from the fact that we also need to estimate the weights q′j,k in equation 1. This extra
source of measurement error should bias us strongly against finding any effect of grandparents’
income on grandchildren. In practice, we will see that this is not the case.
The second component captures the direct effect of first names that goes above and beyond
any direct effect of father’s income. First, there is a direct labor market premium (or penalty)
potentially associated with a given first name. This may reflect factors such as ethnicity,
religion, state of birth, or any other signal of social status associated with a given first name.
In addition, parents might engage in “aspirational naming.” This would be the case if ambitious
and motivated parents who assign children high socio-economic status names also transfer to
them their work-ethic and push them to succeed in the labor market. Both forces are likely
to make the estimator larger than that obtained using individually linked data.
The third component of the difference derives from the use of different samples to impute
the income of the previous generations. This means that the estimator omits the intergener-
ational correlation in motivation, genetic ability, social capital and other unobservables that
are not embodied in first names. If these unobservables are positively correlated across gen-
squares” estimator (Inoue and Solon, 2010), where there are two variables that are instrumented, and each
instrument is constructed using a different sample. Details available upon request.
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erations, as is reasonable to assume, then our estimator will be smaller relative to the linked
estimator.
Overall, the pseudo-panel estimator can be either lower or higher than the linked estima-
tor, depending on which of the three effects dominates. In practice, Olivetti and Paserman
(2015) show that in samples in which one can calculate both, the pseudo-panel estimator is
approximately 30% lower than the linked estimator.14
The description above was presented in terms of the father-son-grandson relationship. It is
easy to see, however, that the methodology can also be applied to fathers-son-granddaughters,
fathers-daughters-grandsons, and fathers-daughters-granddaughters, thus allowing the analy-
sis of gender differentials in the transmission of economic status across multiple generations.
Because married women rarely worked during this period, we will always proxy a woman’s
socioeconomic status by that of her husband. This implies that the income of the middle gen-
eration is always that of the man. In other words, in all our specifications we will regress the
income of a member of generation G3 (this could be either the grandson or the granddaugh-
ter’s husband) on the income of generation G2 (this is always the man) and on the income of
generation G1 (which could be either the maternal or paternal grandfather).
Data and Measurement Issues
We use data from the 1850 to 1940 Decennial Censuses of the United States, which contain
information on first names. For 1850 to 1930 we use the 1% IPUMS samples (Ruggles et
al., 2010). For 1940 we create a 1% extract of the IPUMS Restricted Complete Count Data
(Minnesota Population Center and Ancestry.com, 2013). We restrict all the analysis to whites
to avoid issues associated with the almost complete absence of blacks in the pre-Civil War
14Choi, Gu and Shen (2017) argue that Olivetti and Paserman (2015) understate the downward bias in
the pseudo-panel estimator, because first names are weak instruments for parental income. They calculate
confidence intervals for the intergenerational elasticities presented in Olivetti and Paserman (2015), using
a method that is robust to weak instruments; they find confidence intervals that do not contain the point
estimates reported in the original paper, and in some cases exhibit different trends. We note that the results
in Choi et al (2017) rely on weak instrument asymptotics based on Staiger and Stock (1997), which critically
assume that the instruments satisfy an exclusion restriction. In assuming that the exclusion restriction holds
– namely, that first names have no independent, causal effect on income – they assume away the sources of
upward bias in the estimator which are enumerated above, causing their estimates to be much too high. Olivetti
and Paserman (2015) emphasize that, while their estimator can mechanically be interpreted as a two-sample
two-stage least squares estimator, it is not intended to identify a causal effect of father’s income on son’s income
(as is typical in this literature), and that the “instruments” do not satisfy an exclusion restriction. In this paper,
we are similarly avoiding causal claims. Thus, while appropriate in other settings, we believe that the method
presented in Choi, Gu and Shen (2017) does not lend itself well to our case, and we do not use it here.
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sample, and the fact that even in the late cohorts many blacks would have spent a substantial
part of their lives as slaves.15
Individual level data are available from IPUMS for every decadal Census from 1850 to 1940,
with the exception of 1890. This means that we can calculate our three-generation measures of
intergenerational mobility for three triplets observed at a distance of 20 years from one another
(1860-1880-1900, 1880-1900-1920, and 1900-1920-1940); and for three triplets of observations
observed at a distance of 30 years from one another (1850-1880-1910, 1870-1900-1930, and
1880-1910-1940). This gives us a unique long-run perspective on the transmission of economic
status across generations.
We place the following restrictions on our baseline sample, using the 1860-1880-1900 panel
as an example. G1 consists of parents of children between the ages of 0 and 15 in 1860. G2
consists of parents of children between the age of 0 and 15 in 1880, who are themselves between
the ages of 20 and 35. G3 consists of adults between the ages of 20 and 35 in 1900. In some
specifications (details to follow), we further restrict G2 to consist of individuals whose spouses
are also between the ages of 20-35. We test the sensitivity of our results to some of these
sample restrictions.16
A challenge that applies to all computations of historical intergenerational elasticities is
to obtain appropriate quantitative measures of socioeconomic status. Because income and
earnings at the individual level are not available before the 1940 Census, we are constrained
to use measures of socioeconomic status that are based on individuals’ occupational status.17
While this contrasts with the current practice among economists, who prefer to use direct
measures of income or earnings if available, there is a long tradition in sociology to focus on
occupational categories (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992). One of the advantages of the IPUMS
data set is that it contains a harmonized classification of occupations, and several measures of
occupational status that are comparable across years. For our benchmark analysis, we choose
the OCCSCORE measure of occupational standing. This variable indicates the median total
income (in hundreds of dollars) of persons in each occupation in 1950. More than 200 distinct
15See Collins and Wanamaker (2017) for an historical analysis of African American intergenerational mobility
in the United States.
16For statistics about the distribution of names by gender and year, see tables A1 and A2. While boys’ names
are more concentrated than girls’ names, they obey similar trends over time.
17Income from salaries and wages is available in 1940. However, there is no information on income from self-
employment, which was potentially quite important at the time. Because of this limitation, and to maintain
consistency with the rest of the analysis, we choose not to use this variable.
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occupations appear in our data; however, certain occupations appear at high frequency. In
particular, farmers comprise approximately 40% of the workforce in 1850, though this declines
to 10% by 1940. For this reason, we perform sensitivity analysis with occupational income
distributions from different years.
2.1 Assessing the Methodology
In order to assess our methodology, we compare our intergenerational income elasticities across
three generations to those obtained using the IPUMS Linked Representative Samples. This
comparison requires us to restrict our analysis to males, and to focus on two samples (1860-
1880-1900 and 1850-1880-1910) for which linked data across two cohorts are available.
Using these data, we define G3 income as the income of the adult in the latest year of
the triplet (1900 or 1910). G2 income is the income of this person’s father in 1880; this is a
true link. To obtain G1 income, we create a pseudo link: because we observe the name of the
individual’s father in 1880, we can calculate the average income of fathers of boys with this
name in the first year of the triplet (1860 or 1850).
Table 1 compares estimates of intergenerational mobility obtained using either the linked
data (Panel A) or the pseudo-linked data based on the 1% IPUMS samples and the method-
ology described above (Panel B).
Column 1 and 4 in the table show the standard two-generation intergenerational elasticity.
In Panel A the estimates are based on actual father-son pairs. In Panel B the fathers’ occu-
pational income is imputed based on sons’ first names. As in Olivetti and Paserman (2015),
the latter estimate based on the pseudo link is smaller by 12 to 24 log points.18
Column 2 and 5 show the estimates of a regression of G3 income on G1 income. The
estimates in both panels are based on imputation of G1’s income. However, in Panel A the
imputed value is simply the average income of G1 fathers of G2 children with a given first
name. In Panel B it is a weighted mean of average G1 incomes, weighted by the distribution
of G2 first names.
18Olivetti and Paserman (2015) estimate the two-generation elasticity to be 0.34 for 1880-1900 and 0.32 for
1880-1910. Our estimates here are somewhat smaller because we impose the additional restriction that G2
individuals be between the ages of 20 and 35 (30 to 45 for the 30-year interval); this facilitates our links to
G1. However, a consequence of this restriction is that the number of observations in G2 declines, leading to
increased attenuation bias in the estimated two-generation elasticity.
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This double averaging poses a challenge to our methodology. It implies that the distri-
bution of income for G1 is substantially more compressed than that of G2 and G3. This is
apparent from the standard deviation of the average log occupational income of each of the
three generations (calculated at the G3 name level). In our sample of G2 and G3 males in
1860-1880-1900, this value is 0.314 for G3, 0.298 for G2, and only 0.091 for G1. Similarly,
in our sample of G2 and G3 males in 1850-1880-1910, the standard deviations of mean log
occupational income by first name for G3, G2, and G1 are 0.341, 0.304, and 0.122, respec-
tively. As a result, the OLS estimates of the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity in Panel B are
implausibly large (0.6 and 0.29) compared to those in Panel A (0.24 and 0.17), which do not
require double averaging for the imputation of G1’s income. In addition, standard errors on
the G1 coefficient in Panel B are quite large relative to those in Panel A, despite the sample
in Panel B being 20 to 30 times larger. The same patterns also arise in Column 3 and 6 where
we include both G1 and G2 income on the right hand side.
Because G1 and G2 income have very different distributions (an artifact of our method-
ology), it is difficult to compare the magnitude of the G1-G3 and G2-G3 elasticities, which
is needed to give a sense of what the process of intergenerational persistence looks like. To
address this issue, we change our explanatory variables from mean log occupational income
by first name to percentile ranks of mean of log occupational income by first name.19 This
transformation forces the variance of G1 and G2 income to be similar. The results are reported
in Table 2. While there is still a discrepancy in the G2-G3 elasticities between Panels A and
B, as one would expect because of the imputation, the coefficients on G1 are fairly similar.
Moreover, the coefficient on G1 income is estimated as precisely as the one on G2 income. In
the remainder of the paper, we will use percentile ranks as our explanatory variables.
The coefficients in columns 1 and 4 in Panel B indicate that going from the bottom to
the top percentile of earnings in generation G2 is associated with an increase in G3’s log
occupational income of about 0.26. Going from the bottom to the top percentile in G1 income
is associated with a 0.13 to 0.15 increase, implying a fairly strong correlation between the
socioeconomic status of grandsons and paternal grandfathers. Moreover, we find that G1’s
rank is significantly positively associated with the log income of G3, even after controlling
19The results are essentially identical if we use the percentile rank of mean occupational income in levels or
if we also use percentile ranks for the dependent variable. Moreover, our key results about gender differences
in the process of intergenerational transmission persist if we do not transform our explanatory variables.
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for the rank of G2 (columns 3 and 6). The statistically significant coefficient on G1 income
implies that estimates using two generations overstate the extent of long-run mobility. Our
estimates in Table 2 imply that a given shock to a dynasty’s income would take at least one
more generation to fade out relative to what would be predicted by an AR(1) process with no
measurement error. For example, take the estimates in column 4 and 6 in Panel B. Based on
the AR(1) estimate, it would take 2 generations for 90% of the shock to dissipate. For 99%
of the shock to disappear, it would take 4 generations. The corresponding numbers for the
AR(2) model are, instead, 3 and 5 generations.
We can compare these numbers to Ferrie and Long (2017, Table V) who estimate three-
generation mobility along the paternal line. They use data linked across three generations
(1850-1880-1910), and they impute income based on the 1860 occupational wealth distribution.
Their estimates are roughly similar to ours, with a slightly lower G2-G3 elasticity in both the
AR(1) and the AR(2) models (0.234 and 0.216, respectively), but a slightly higher G1-G3
elasticity (0.145 and 0.091). Their AR(2) estimates imply the same level of persistence of a
given income shock as that predicted by our calculations.
3 Results
3.1 Basic Results
We now apply our methodology to study how both grandsons and granddaughters are affected
by grandparents, along both the maternal and the paternal line. Table 3 presents regressions
of G3 earnings on the percentile rank of earnings of G1 and G2, using all possible gender
combinations and all decade triplets in which the distance between generations is 20 years
(1860-1880-1900; 1880-1900-1920; 1900-1920-1940). Panel A reports the results for grandsons
(G3 Male), while Panel B reports the estimates obtained for granddaughters (G3 Female).
There are two columns for each decade triplet reporting the elasticities along the paternal and
the maternal line, respectively.20
The coefficient on G1 is positive and significant in almost all cases. We find interesting
differences in the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity by gender. We first look at the relative
20Table A3 follows the same structure for the decade triplets in which the distance between generations is
30 years (1850-1880-1910; 1870-1900-1930; 1880-1910-1940).
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importance of maternal and paternal grandfathers. For grandsons (Panel A), the elasticity
with respect to paternal grandfather’s income is consistently larger than the elasticity with
respect to maternal grandfather’s income. For granddaughters (Panel B), the pattern appears
to be reversed (maternal grandfathers have a larger influence than paternal grandfathers),
even though the evidence is more mixed.21
We then look at whether paternal and maternal grandfathers affect grandchildren of differ-
ent genders differently. (This can be seen by comparing the same cell across Panels A and B.)
Paternal grandfathers’ income tend to be more strongly associated with grandsons’ income
than granddaughters’ income. The opposite pattern appears when looking at the effect of
maternal grandfathers – they tend to have a greater influence on their granddaughters than
their grandsons.22
3.2 Robustness
One initial concern is that comparisons by gender may be sensitive to the way our samples
are constructed. For example, we measure a woman’s socioeconomic status by the earnings of
her husband. This means that all women in our sample are married, whereas men need not be
married to be included. As such, we may be measuring differences in intergenerational income
transmission by marital status rather than gender. Furthermore, we do not place restrictions
on the age of these husbands in our baseline specification; therefore, our results may reflect
the fact that we are measuring income at different points in the life cycle for women and men.
To ensure that our results are not being driven by these details of our sample construction,
we redo the analysis imposing different restrictions on G2 and G3. The additional restriction
we impose on G2 is that individuals in the sample be married to a spouse in the same age range
21The results in Table 3 suggest an increasing trend in the G1-G3 elasticity for grandsons (Panel A) but not
for granddaughters (Panel B). We don’t emphasize the trend results, however, because the comparability of
our estimates over time relies on the distribution and explanatory power of names being roughly similar across
census years, which is a stronger assumption in this application of the first names methodology.
22We note that it is unlikely that the gender differences themselves can be fully explained by measurement
error. Paternal grandfathers could matter more than maternal grandfathers if paternal grandfather’s income is
more strongly correlated with the error in father’s income than maternal grandfather’s income. However, the
differential should then be the same for both grandsons and granddaughters, contrary to our empirical findings.
Gender differences in the explanatory power of first names are also unlikely to bias us in the direction of our
findings. First names have more explanatory power for women than men (Olivetti and Paserman 2015), which
should tend to make maternal grandfathers more strongly linked to both granddaughters and grandsons, and
should make granddaughters more strongly influenced by their grandfathers than grandsons. This is not the
pattern we uncover.
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as the individual (20-35 or 30-45, depending on the sample years). We impose two additional
restrictions on G3. First, we restrict individuals to be married; second, we restrict individuals
to be married to a spouse in his or her age range. We calculate the G1-G3 intergenerational
elasticity for each of 6 combinations of these sample restrictions (including the baseline sample
restrictions). The results, using the 1860-1880-1900 sample, are reported in Table A4 in the
Appendix.23 Altogether, it appears that these different sample restrictions have only a minimal
effect on the baseline results.
To summarize the results of the above robustness analysis, we compile all G1-G3 inter-
generational elasticities estimated under different sample restrictions in each decade triplet.
There are 144 such estimates.24 We regress these on indicators for chronological order (earli-
est, middle, or latest sample), the interval that separates generations (20 or 30 years), the type
of grandfather, the gender of G3, and categorical variables indicating which sample restric-
tions are imposed. Standard errors are clustered at the specification level. We report these
results in Table 4. In column (1) we pool all specifications, and in the remaining columns
we separate them by gender. Column (2) contains only G3 males, and column (3) contains
only G3 females; similarly, column (4) contains only paternal grandfathers, and column (5)
contains only maternal grandfathers.
While there is no overall tendency for the coefficient to be higher when G2 is male, the
picture changes dramatically when we separate G3 by gender. For G3 males, the effect of
the paternal grandfather is clearly stronger. For G3 females, the opposite is true. There
is no significant difference in the G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity by gender of G3 overall,
but this masks significant differences when we separate by gender of G2 (i.e. comparing the
effect of maternal and paternal grandfathers). The impact of the paternal grandfather is much
stronger for G3 males than G3 females. The impact of the maternal grandfather tends to be
stronger for G3 females, although this is not quite statistically significant.
23The full set of results, using all samples, are available on request.
24Four possible combinations of grandparents (paternal and maternal) and grandchildren (male and female);
two time intervals (at 20 and 30-year); three time periods; two possible sample restrictions on G2; and three
possible sample restrictions on G3: 4 × 2 × 3 × 2 × 3 = 144.
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3.3 Gender Differentials: Extension of Methodology
In order to assess the gender differences documented above more directly, we extend our
methodology to include both grandfathers in the same regression. To see how this can be
accomplished, consider the following example. Suppose there is one G3 child named Adam
in 1880, and his parents (both between the ages of 20 and 35) are named Bill and Barbara.
The (G2) income of both Bill and Barbara is defined as Bill’s income, as we are defining
a woman’s income as that of her husband. Paternal G1 income will be the average income
of fathers of children named Bill in 1860; similarly, maternal G1 income will be the average
income of fathers of children named Barbara in 1860. These values can both be included in
a regression of Adam’s (G3) income in 1900 on the income of G2 and G1. This approach
has two advantages: first, it allows us to estimate the effect of one grandparent’s income,
holding the income of the other grandparent constant; second, we can directly test whether
or not paternal grandparents have a greater effect on grandchildren’s income than maternal
grandparents, which is what our results so far suggest.
These results are presented in Table 5. Rather than estimating G1-G3 elasticities for each
pseudo-panel separately, we pool all three panels constructed at 20-year (columns 1 and 2)
or 30-year (columns 3 and 4) intervals, and include decade controls in our regressions. This
allows us to characterize gender differences in the transmission of socioeconomic status over
the entire sample period.25 The regressions are run separately for G3 males and females, and
the coefficients are reported side by side. The third to last row contains the p-value from a
test of the equality of the coefficients on paternal and maternal G1, for a given G3 gender.
For G3 males, the coefficient on paternal G1 is significantly higher than the coefficient on
maternal G1 in both the panels constructed at 20 and 30 year intervals. For G3 females, the
coefficient on maternal G1 is larger than the coefficient on paternal G1 in both cases, but it
is only significant (at the 10% level) when the panels are constructed at 30 year intervals.
Looking across columns, we see that the coefficient on paternal G1 tends to be higher
for G3 males than for G3 females, and this is statistically significant in both cases (the p-
value for this test is reported in the second to last row of the table). The opposite is true
25Our findings are similar if we pool all pseudo-panels and estimate the impact of maternal and paternal
grandfathers independently. This indicates that the results are not driven by the relative position of one of the
spouses in the middle generation, which may affect grandsons and granddaughters differently.
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of the coefficient on maternal G1: this is higher for G3 females, and this difference is always
significant (p-value reported in the last row of the table).26
We test the sensitivity of these results to our method of measuring occupational income.
Our findings make use of a ranking of occupations based on the 1950 occupational wage
distribution. If the 1950 wage distribution differs from the wage distribution during the period
we focus on, this may affect our results. Most importantly, our results are likely to be sensitive
to the placement of farmers in the occupational wage distribution, as farmers comprise a very
large fraction of the occupations in our sample.
To test the sensitivity of our results to the occupational ranking, we use an occupational
income distribution from 1900, and we impute a wage for farmers using data from the 1900
Census of Agriculture. The 1900 occupational wage distribution is obtained from the tabula-
tions in Preston and Haines (1991). These tabulations are based on the 1901 Cost of Living
Survey, which was designed to investigate the cost of living of families in industrial locales in
the United States.27 Preston and Haines explicitly refrained from imputing an average income
for generic farm owners. To fill this gap, we impute farmer’s income using data from the 1900
Census of Agriculture and a method based on Abramitzky et al. (2012).28
To further test that our results are not sensitive to our occupational wage measure, we also
rank occupations based on personal property reported in 1860 and 1870. This is advantageous
because it corresponds to the earlier periods in our analysis. We calculate mean personal
property of household heads by occupation, pooling data from 1860 and 1870 and adjusting
for price differences between these two decades. One issue is that farmers’ personal property
consists largely of equipment or resources used in productive activities. Including this property
will likely overstate the status of farmers considerably. Therefore, we adjust farmers’ personal
26We have also experienced with including interactions between paternal and maternal grandparents, as well
as interactions between grandparents’ and parents’ income. Significant interaction effects could point to the
presence of either substitutability or complementarity between different grandparents (or between grandparents
and parents) in the production of grandchildren’s human capital. In the vast majority of specifications we did
not find any evidence of significant interaction effects, and in any case the pattern of signs was not consistent.
27One limitation of this measure is that the survey collected data for the “typical” urban family, meaning
that, by construction, the resulting income distribution is more compressed than what one would obtain in a
representative sample.
28In an nutshell, for owner-occupier farmers, we calculate income as the difference between the value of farm
products (augmented by the value of rent and food consumed by the family) and the total expenditures on
labor, fertilizer, feed, seeds, threshing, taxes and maintenance. (this results in an imputed annual income of
$576). For farm tenants, we imputed the income for specialized farm workers (stock raisers, fruit growers, etc.)
in the Preston-Haines tabulations. We then assign a weighted average of owner-occupiers’ and tenants’ income
to farmers. For more details see Olivetti and Paserman (2015), Appendix C.
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property downward by the average value of farm equipment and livestock in 1860 and 1870,
using national average values from the census of agriculture (Haines and ICPSR 2010).29
We report results using the 1900 wage distribution and the 1860-1870 occupational wealth
distribution in Table 6. We estimate the coefficient on maternal and paternal grandparents
simultaneously, as we did in Table 5, pooling all three panels constructed at 20 years intervals.30
When we use the 1900 wage distribution, the magnitude of the G1-G3 elasticity is quite
comparable to that obtained using the 1950 occupational wage distribution. The gender
differences in the G1-G3 elasticity also remain, although these differences are not always
significant at conventional levels. Similarly when we use the 1860-1870 wealth distribution,
though the G1 coefficients are typically larger in this case.
A concern is that error in the measurement of parental or grandparental income may be
related to gender. Because we don’t observe the socioeconomic status of G2 women, we are
unable to control for this directly. Thus, the inclusion of maternal G1’s socioeconomic status
may “correct” more measurement error than the inclusion of paternal G1’s status. While this
may tend to increase the apparent importance of maternal grandfathers relative to paternal
grandfathers, this effect is present for both granddaughters and grandsons. Thus, it is unlikely
to explain the precise gender differences we uncover.
Measurement error introduced by gender-specific naming patterns is another potential
explanation for our findings. For example, suppose that families commonly name boys after
their fathers (or paternal grandfathers), but they name girls after their mothers (or maternal
grandmothers). This would bias us in favor of finding that paternal grandfathers “matter”
more for grandsons, and maternal grandfathers “matter” more for granddaughters. To see
this, consider a simple example in which there are two possible male names – Adam and
Bill – and two possible female names – Abigail and Barbara – and in which sons are named
for their fathers and daughters are named for their mothers.31 In this case, boys named
Adam will all have fathers named Adam, but girls named Abigail may have a father named
Adam or Bill. Similarly, girls named Abigail will have have mothers named Abigail, while
boys named Adam may have a mother named Abigail or Barbara. So long as names are
29This follows Olivetti and Paserman (2015). An alternative that yields similar results is to calculate the
occupational ranking as mean personal property by occupation excluding the South (Ferrie and Long, 2015).
30Results using panels constructed at 30 year intervals can be found in appendix table A5.
31The same reasoning applies if boys are named for their paternal grandfathers and girls are named for their
maternal grandmothers.
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informative about socioeconomic status – a critical assumption for our methodology – Adam’s
paternal grandfather’s income will be measured more precisely than his maternal grandfather’s
income, while Abigail’s maternal grandfather’s income will be measured more precisely than
her paternal grandfather’s income.
We address this concern in two ways. First, we control for sibling age rank.32 The idea is
that first born children are more likely to be named for their parents or grandparents; thus, the
measurement error we are concerned about should be most pronounced for first born children.
This does not affect our results. Second, we look for gender asymmetry in the concentration
of parents’ and children’s names. In the above example, the concern is that all Adams have
fathers named Adams and all Abigails have fathers named Abigail, but the mothers of Adam
and fathers of Abigail may have a variety of names. In other words, fathers’ names are more
concentrated for sons, while mothers’ names are more concentrated for daughters. In tables
A1 and A2, we calculate a Herfindahl index of fathers’ and mothers’ names, for both sons and
daughters. There is no evidence of the type of asymmetry that would bias our results in the
direction we find.
One may also be concerned that there is a mechanical correlation between grandparents and
grandchildren because of the custom of naming children after their grandparents. However,
the fact that grandchildren and grandparents have the same name does not necessarily imply
a correlation in their socioeconomic status. Moreover, remember that our empirical strategy
does not depend in any way on grandparents’ first names. Parents’ income is proxied by names
of G3 children, and grandparents’ income is proxied by the names of the middle generation G2.
Therefore, whether a grandchild has the same name as his or her grandparent is inconsequential
for the empirical estimates. 33
Finally we have tested the sensitivity of our findings to including controls for age, im-
migrant status, literacy (results not reported). These controls have a minimal effect on the
coefficients on G1 earnings, and they do not alter the underlying patterns we find.34 Alto-
32Results available on request. The sibling age rank of an adult named i in year t is equal to the mean sibling
age rank among children named i in year t− 20 (or t− 30).
33We have also run a simulation exercise analyzing what happens if children are named after their grand-
parents. Regardless of whether children are named systematically after their grandparents, or only after their
successful grandparents, the estimates of the G1-G3 relationship is completely unaffected. Results available
upon request.
34We have also tested the sensitivity of our results to treating first names differently when creating our
pseudo-panels. We use two alternative name groupings. First, we divide individuals with the same first name
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gether, we conclude that status is transmitted across three generations in a way that depends
on gender, even though some of the results are somewhat sensitive to the exact measurement
of income.
4 Interpretation
The empirical analysis in the previous sections has uncovered a number of interesting stylized
facts about the intergenerational correlations between grandchildren and their paternal and
maternal grandfathers. To summarize, we have documented that the income of grandsons is
correlated most strongly with that of their paternal grandfathers. Conversely, granddaughters’
income is most strongly related to that of their maternal grandfathers. In addition, paternal
grandfathers are more important for their grandsons than their granddaughters, while the
ranking is reversed for maternal grandfathers. We discuss here several possible mechanisms
that could rationalize these findings, and include a formal treatment of one of them in the
appendix.
4.1 Direct Investments by Grandparents
If paternal and maternal grandparents have different preferences over their grandchildren’s
consumption, this may lead them to directly invest differently in these grandchildren. Paternal
grandparents may invest more, for example, if the custom of passing surnames along the male
line led grandfathers to develop a stronger preference for grandchildren that carry their family
name. On the other hand, given that women married and had children much earlier than men,
maternal grandparents were more likely to know their grandchildren, which would allow them
to invest directly in their human capital, thus reversing the relative importance of maternal
and paternal grandparents.
Postmarital location norms could have facilitated the direct investment of paternal grandfa-
thers in their grandchildren. If the U.S. was largely a virilocal society (i.e., married couples live
with the husband’s family), we would expect transmission across generations to be strongest
along the paternal line. However, an examination of the 1880 and 1900 IPUMS samples reveals
into two groups: those who report a first initial and those who do not. Second, we define “names” to be soundex
codes; this will group together people with differently spelled but phonetically similar names. The results are
broadly similar, and are available upon request.
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that only 10-12 percent of married couples under 35 resided in the same household as a parent,
even though that parent was significantly more likely to belong to the husband, especially in
agricultural families. The importance of this channel is likely to have declined over our sample
period with the decline of the farming sector in the U.S. economy.
In short, it is not clear whether direct investments by grandparents should favor transmis-
sion along the paternal or maternal line. In order for direct investments by grandparents to
explain our findings, it would have to be that paternal grandparents invested more in their
grandsons, while maternal grandparents invested more in their granddaughters.
4.2 Institutions
There were a number of institutions in force during the 19th and early 20th centuries that
may have caused economic statust to be passed along the paternal and maternal lines in
different ways. For example, if sons inherited a larger portion of the family wealth than
daughters, this would mechanically lead to a stronger correlation between the economic status
of grandchildren and their paternal grandfathers. During the Colonial period there was in fact
unequal treatment of daughters in terms of inheritance laws: primogeniture or the “double
portion” provision for the eldest son ensured that gender and birth order affected the amount of
wealth inherited. However, by 1800 primogeniture had been formally abandoned everywhere
(Alston and Schapiro, 1984) and in most states sons and daughters were entitled to equal
shares of personal and real property (Shammas et al., 1987). In practice, around the turn of
the 19th century daughters were still treated somewhat unequally, but by 1890 the treatment
of sons and daughters had become virtually identical (Shammas et al., 1987, based on a sample
of probate records from Bucks County, Pennsylvania). Therefore, this mechanical correlation
seems unlikely to be relevant for our period of analysis.
Other institutions may have granted paternal and maternal grandfathers an unequal ability
to monitor transfers to their grandchildren. Botticini and Siow (2003) argue that in virilocal
societies, altruistic parents will leave dowries to their daughters and bequests to their sons to
mitigate a free-rider problem.35 Furthermore, through most of the 19th Century, women com-
35Others emphasize consumption smoothing and the role of marital arrangements for solving agency problems
(see for example Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989, based on data on rural India; and Fafchamps and Quisumbing,
2005a and 2005b, on rural Ethiopia). We investigate the insurance motive by running a regression that includes
an interaction term between parent and grandparents income. We did not find any evidence that grandparents
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pletely relinquished control of their assets to their husbands. Under the doctrine of coverture,
a husband owned any wages earned by his wife and any property she brought to the marriage
(Geddes and Lueck, 2002).
These institutions imply that in the presence of a daughter, the G1 patriarch would have
had little say over the allocation of resources between the second and third generations. The
daughter was less likely to live in close proximity, and the rights on any transfers she received
upon marriage would have been transferred to the husband. On the other hand, sons were
more likely to receive a bequest only upon the patriarch’s death. The ability of the patriarch
to withhold the transfer of resources to his male offspring would have made it easier for him
to monitor and influence the allocation of resources between son and grandchildren.
This is significant if the preferences of grandfathers with respect to grandchildren’s con-
sumption are systematically different from those of the middle generation. Specifically, con-
sider a dynastic model of intergenerational transmission, in which each generation has quasi-
hyperbolic, or β− δ preferences over its own consumption and that of future generations.36 If
each generation heavily discounts the utility of future generations relative to its own utility,
but the discount factor between any two future generations is relatively low, this creates a
tension between grandparents’ and parents’ desired allocation of consumption across the three
generations. Namely, grandparents (G1) prefer to allocate more to their grandchildren (G3),
relative to what would be chosen by the parents (G2). So, the G1-G3 elasticity should be
greater when G1 is better able to enforce his preferred allocation across the three generations.
This mechanism may have been relevant for most of the 19th Century but is less likely to
have played a role during our sample period. As we documented above, virilocality was already
on the decline in the second half of the 19th Century. Also, formal dowries were relatively
uncommon. Botticini and Siow (2003) show that in late 18th Century Connecticut, between
46 and 67 percent of married daughters were assigned inter vivos transfers from their family
of origin, likely at the time of their marriage, but by the 1820s, only 40 percent received such
transfers. Finally, most States abandoned the doctrine of coverture in the second half of the
Century. By 1880, three quarters of the states allowed women the ownership and control over
have a larger effect if parents are poorer, independent of G3 gender.
36Quasi-hyperbolic preferences have been made popular in recent years to model the intra-personal self-
control problems in consumption and savings decisions and other contexts (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 1999; DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005). However, one of the first applications of β − δ preferences
(Phelps and Pollak, 1968) was to an intergenerational growth model that would be applicable here.
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all property they brought to the marriage.
Therefore, it appears that most of the institutions that could have led to a greater impor-
tance of paternal grandparents were no longer prevalent by the time we begin our analysis.
Furthermore, all of the above explanations do not differentiate by the gender of the grand-
children, and have difficulty in rationalizing our finding of a gender asymmetry in the relative
importance of paternal and maternal grandparents.
4.3 Gender Differences in the Heritability and Valuation of Traits
A plausible explanation for the gender asymmetry we observe is that traits related to socioe-
conomic status and the marriage market are inherited along gendered lines. More specifically,
it may be that sons are more influenced by their fathers, while daughters are more influenced
by their mothers. This may occur if children are more inclined to view the parent of their
same sex as a role model to imitate. Classic studies in social psychology and psychoanalysis
offer theoretical underpinning for this conjecture. Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) argue that
children emulate their parent of the same gender because such behavior is socially reinforced,
or that children emulate the parent with whom they spend the most time, which is typically
the parent of the same gender. Chodorow (1978) suggests that mothers pass traits expressly
related to “mothering” onto their daughters, which occurs because daughters are more likely to
personally identify with their mother than their father. Lamb (1976) argues that fathers play
a bigger role in the development of their sons than their daughters.37 More recently a number
of studies in economics (Thomas, 1994), developmental psychology (Keller, 2002, Weinberg et
al., 1999) and cultural and social anthropology (Godoy et al., 2006) provide empirical evidence
of differential investment of fathers and mothers along gender lines.
While consistent with the patterns we document, a gender asymmetry in the heritability of
traits is not sufficient to explain them. If traits are inherited along gendered lines, we should
expect men’s status to be more linked to their paternal grandfathers, and women’s status to
be more linked to their maternal grandmothers. Because we measure women’s socioeconomic
status by that of their husbands, what we show in practice is that men’s status is more strongly
linked to their paternal grandfathers, and women’s husbands’ status is more linked to their
37See also Boyd (1989) for a review of alternative models of the mother-daughter relationship as well as
empirical research on this topic.
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maternal grandfathers. So, it is essential that husbands’ and wives’ socioeconomic status be
similar in order for this to explain our findings. In other words, mating must be assortative.
However, if mating were perfectly assortative, we wouldn’t observe the asymmetry we doc-
ument, as husbands’ and wives’ traits would be identical. Thus, either mating is not perfectly
assortative, or the traits individuals match on are more complicated than socioeconomic status
alone.
In the appendix, we present a model of intergenerational mobility and multi-trait matching
that can generate imperfect assortativeness and explain the findings. The model is adapted
from Chen et al. (2013), but allows for multiple generations. The basic premise is that
individuals are characterized by multiple traits, which are differently valued by men and
women in the marriage market. It is helpful to divide these into “market traits,” which directly
affect an individual’s earning potential and include qualities like cognitive skills or education,
and “non-market traits”, which have little impact on market productivity but are valued in
the marriage market, including physical attractiveness, health, kindness and other attributes
signaling reproductive capacity. While both types of traits influence the attractiveness of both
men and women, there may be an asymmetry in their relative importance. Specifically, market
traits may be more important in determining the attractiveness of men, while non-market
traits may be more important in determining the attractiveness of women. This conjecture
can be rationalized by biological differences in reproductive roles and in the persistence of
gender roles within households (see, for example, Buss, 1989, Eagly et al., 2000, 2004). Even
today, evidence based on on-line dating and speed-dating shows that men and women value
different attributes in prospective partners (see, for example, Fisman et al., 2006).38 Such an
asymmetry in the importance of market and non-market traits will serve to attenuate the link
between a husband’s and wife’s socioeconomic status, even when matching on a composite
measure of “attractiveness” is perfectly assortative.
5 Case Study: Regional Differences
It is possible that our baseline results mask regional heterogeneity in the G1-G3 transmission
process. Table 7 presents the results obtained when we estimate the model separately by
38A handful of studies in economics have emphasized the importance of biological gender differentials on
gender roles and market outcomes. See for example, Siow (1998) and Cox (2003).
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region of residence at 20 year intervals.39 The results reveal marked regional differences in the
role of gender in the transmission of economic status across generations. We discuss primarily
the differences between the Northeast (columns 1 and 2) and the South (columns 5 and 6). In
the Midwest (columns 3 and 4) most of the gender differences are insignificant, and therefore
it is difficult to make strong claims about this region.
In the Northeast, the strongest relationship is the one between grandsons and paternal
grandfathers. Furthermore, paternal grandfathers seem to have an effect on their grandchil-
dren of both genders, while the effect of maternal grandfathers is never significant. Finally,
grandsons are more strongly affected by their grandfathers on both sides. In contrast, in the
South the strongest relationship is the one between granddaughters and maternal grandfathers.
Both grandfathers have a significant impact on the outcomes of grandchildren of both gen-
ders. However, maternal grandfathers clearly matter more for granddaughters than paternal
grandfathers, while the evidence for grandsons is more mixed. Finally, maternal grandfathers
have a significantly larger impact on granddaughters than grandsons. This evidence suggests
that in the South the chain of intergenerational transmission is stronger along the maternal
line, while the paternal line seems the more dominant one in the Northeast.
In the previous section, we discussed institutions that favored transmission along the pater-
nal line; namely, the doctrine of coverture, which allowed parents to better monitor transfers
to married sons than married daughters. This institution persisted the longest in the South
(Kahn 1996). As such, it is unlikely that regional differences in institutions can explain why
transmission along the maternal line is most important in the South, while transmission along
the paternal line is most important in the Northeast.
These differences may, however, be consistent with gender differences in the heritability and
valuation of traits. Assume that traits are inherited along gender lines, and that market traits
have more influence on the attractiveness of men while non-market traits have more influence
on the attractiveness of women. Then, transmission along the paternal line will tend to be
stronger when market traits are more intergenerationally persistent, while the reverse is true
when non-market traits are more persistent.40 Thus, we may see that paternal grandfathers
39Results using panels constructed at 30 year intervals can be found in appendix table A6.
40We make this point formally in the model presented in Appendix A. The reason is intuitive, and can be
understood by way of a simple example. First, suppose that the market trait is perfectly persistent, while the
non-market trait is not at all persistent. Because we directly observe men’s market traits (i.e. occupational
income), and men inherit traits from their fathers, we should expect to see transmission of economic status
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matter more in the Northeast and maternal grandfathers matter more in the South if market
traits are more persistent in the Northeast or non-market traits are more persistent in the
South. These are both plausible conjectures, given what we know about these regions during
the period under investigation.
One reason for the market trait to be “stickier” in the Northeast than the South is that the
South experienced more industrial upheaval during the early 20th century – the time frame
from which all of our G3 samples are drawn – than the Northeast did. In particular, the
South experienced a large decline in the prevalence of agriculture between 1900 and 1940. In
1900, approximately 60% of the Southern workforce was engaged in agriculture; by 1940, this
figure was less than 30%. In contrast, the fraction of the Northeastern workforce engaged in
agriculture fell from 15% to 5% between 1900 and 1940, a much smaller absolute decline.41
The South was converging with the rest of the country in terms of industrial composition
during this period (Kim and Margo, 2004), which might mean that there was more mobility
– in terms of market traits – in the South than in the Northeast. This is especially likely if
occupational or industrial knowledge is one of the market traits that fathers pass on to their
sons.
The other potential explanation for the differences between the Northeast and the South is
that non-market traits – such as kindness, attractiveness, and reproductive or parenting ability
– are “stickier” in the South than the Northeast. Historians characterize the South as highly
conservative with respect to gender roles. Scott (1970, p. 4) describes the ‘ideal’ antebellum
southern woman as “a submissive wife whose reason for being was to love, honor, obey, and
occasionally amuse her husband, to bring up his children and to manage his household.” This
persisted through the 19th and 20th centuries: southern states were slow to adopt legislation
expanding women’s property rights during the 19th century (Kahn 1996), and were largely
resistant to women’s suffrage in the early 20th century (Green 1997). Looking more recently,
along the paternal line. If mating on “attractiveness” is assortative, women with high values of the non-market
trait will marry men with high values of the market trait. But if the non-market trait is not transmitted
intergenerationally, we will see no transmission of economic status along the maternal line. On the other hand,
suppose the market trait is not persistent across generations but the non-market trait is perfectly persistent. In
this case, we should see no transmission of economic status along the paternal line. However, because mothers
with high values of the non-market trait have daughters with high values of the non-market trait, and women
with high values of the non-market trait marry men with high values of the market trait, we should see great
persistence in economic status along the maternal line.
41These figures are based on the authors’ calculations using census data (Ruggles et al 2010).
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researchers have found that while southerners’ attitudes toward gender roles had started to
converge with the rest of country by the late 20th century, there was still a significant gap
(Rice and Coates 1995; Hurlbert 1988). In terms of the model, this difference in gender roles
may lead to a higher persistence of the non-market trait in the South. If women spent more
time “mothering” in the South, and if “mothering ability” is an important non-market trait,
then it could be passed along more persistently in that region.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated intergenerational elasticities across three generations for the
US spanning the late 19th and early 20th Century, focusing on the differential role of maternal
and paternal grandparents on both granddaughters and grandsons.
We find that both paternal and maternal grandparents matter for grandchildren’s out-
comes, even after controlling for the father’s socioeconomic status. Moreover, the transmis-
sion of economic status follows gendered lines: grandsons are more strongly correlated with
paternal grandfathers, while maternal grandfathers are more correlated with granddaughters.
We interpret these results in light of a matching model where an individual’s socioeconomic
status is determined by two traits that are inherited from the same sex parent and whose
relative importance varies by gender.
Our results can have important implications for our understanding of the persistence of
socioeconomic status over the long run. Recent studies have shown that grandfathers, typically
paternal ones, have a distinct impact on the outcomes of their grandchildren. Our contribution
is to show that maternal grandparents also matter, pointing to the key role of mothers for
the transmission of status across multiple generations. The upshot of this result is that
stratification in marriage by social class might amplify cross-sectional inequality and lead to
lower mobility across generations, even in a context in which married women contributed little
to household income.
28
References
[1] Abramitzky, Ran, Leah Platt Boustan and Katherine Eriksson (2012). “Europe’s Tired,
Poor, Huddled Masses: Self-Selection and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Mi-
gration.” American Economic Review, 102(5), pp. 1832-1856.
[2] Alston, Lee J. and Morton Owen Schapiro (1984). “Inheritance Laws Across Colonies:
Causes and Consequences.” Journal of Economic History. 44(2): 277-287.
[3] Becker, Gary S. and Tomes, Nigel (1979). “An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of
Income and Intergenerational Mobility.” Journal of Political Economy, 87(6): 1153-1189.
[4] Bertrand, Marianne and Sendil Mullainathan (2004). “Are Emily and Greg More Employ-
able than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination.”
American Economic Review. 94(4): 991-1013.
[5] Black, Sandra E. and Paul J. Devereux (2011). “Recent Developments in Intergenerational
Mobility,” in (O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume
4B, pp. 1487-1541, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[6] Botticini, Maristella and Aloysius Siow (2003). “Why Dowries?” American Economic
Review, 93(4), pp. 1385-1398.
[7] Boyd, Carol J. (1989). “Mothers and Daughters: A Discussion of Theory and Research.”
Journal of Marriage and Family. 51(2), pp. 291-301.
[8] Braun, Sebastian and Jan Stuhler (2016). “The Transmission of Inequality Across Mul-
tiple Generations: Testing Recent Theories with Evidence from Germany.” Economic
Journal, forthcoming.
[9] Buss, D.M. (1989). Sex differences in human mate preferences: evolutionary hypotheses
tested in 37 cultures. Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 12: 1-49.
[10] Celhay, Pablo and Sebastian Gallegos (2016). “Persistence in the Transmission of Educa-
tion: Evidence across Three Generations for Chile,” Journal of Human Development and
Capabilities, 16 (3): 420-451.
29
[11] Chadwick, Laura and Gary Solon (2002). “Intergenerational Mobility among Daughters.”
American Economic Review, 92(1), pp. 335-344.
[12] Chen, Natalie, Conconi, Paola and Carlo Perroni (2013). “Multi-Trait Matching and
Gender Differentials in Intergenerational Mobility.” Economic Letters, 102(2), pp. 292-
296.
[13] Chetty, Raj, Hendren, Nathaniel, Kline, Patrick, Saez, Emmanuel and Nicholas Turner
(2014a). “Is the United States Still a Land of Opportunity? Recent Trends in Intergen-
erational Mobility.” American Economic Review, 104(5), pp. 141-147.
[14] Chetty, Raj, Hendren, Nathaniel, Kline, Patrick and Emmanuel Saez (2014b). “Where is
the Land of Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United
States.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4), pp. 1553-1623.
[15] Chodorow, Nancy (1978). The Reproduction of Mothering. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
[16] Choi, Jaerim, Jiaying Gu, and Shu Shen (2017). “Weak-instrument Robust Inference for
Two-sample Instrumental Variables Regression.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 33:
109-125.
[17] Clark, Gregory (2014) The Son Also Rises: Surnames and the History of Social Mobility.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[18] Collado, Dolores M., Ignacio Ortun˜o Ort´ın, and Andre´s Romeu (2012). “Intergenera-
tional Linkages in Consumption Patterns and the Geographic Distribution of Surnames.”
Regional Science and Urban Economics. 42(1-2): 341-350.
[19] Collins, William J. and Marianne H. Wanamaker (2017). “Up from Slavery? African
American Intergeneration Economic Mobility Since 1880,” NBER Working Paper No.
23395 (May).
[20] Cox, Donald (2003). “Private Transfers within the Family: Mothers, Fathers, Sons and
Daughters,” in (Alicia H. Munnell and Annika Sunden, eds.) Death and Dollars: The
Role of Gifts and Bequests in America, Brookings Institution.
30
[21] Currie, Janel and Enrico Moretti (2007). “Biology as Destiny? Short- and Long-Run
Determinants of Intergenerational Transmission of Birth Weight.” Journal of Labor Eco-
nomics. 25: 231-264.
[22] Della Vigna, Stefano and M. Daniele Paserman (2005). “Job Search and Impatience.”
Journal of Labor Economics, 23(3), pp. 527-588.
[23] Dribe, Martin and Jonas Helgertz (2016). “The Lasting Impact of Grandfathers: Class,
Occupational Status, and Earnings over Three Generations in Sweden, 1815-2011.” Jour-
nal of Economic History, 76(4), pp. 969-1000.
[24] Duflo, Esther (2003) “Grandmothers and Granddaughters: Old-Age Pensions and Intra-
household Allocation in South Africa,” World Bank Economic Review, 17 (1), pp. 1-25.
[25] Eagly, A.H., W. Wood and A. Diekman (2000). “Social Role Theory of Sex Differences
and Similarities: A Current Appraisal.” In Psychology of Gender, Eds. A.H. Eagly, A.
Beall, and R.J. Sternberg, New York: Guilford.
[26] Eagly, A.H., W. Wood, and M.C. Johannesen-Schmidt (2004). “The Social Role Theory
of Sex Differences and Similarities: Implications for Partner Preference.”’ In Psychology
of Gender, Eds. A.H. Eagly, A. Beall, and R.J. Sternberg, 2nd Ed., New York: Guilford.
[27] Erikson, Robert and John H. Goldthorpe (1992). The Constant Flux: A Study of Class
Mobility in Industrial Societies. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[28] Fafchamps, Marcel and Agnes Quisumbing (2005a). “Assets at Marriage in Rural
Ethiopia.” Journal of Development Economics, 77(1), pp. 1-25.
[29] Fafchamps, Marcel and Agnes Quisumbing (2005b). “Marriage, Bequest, and Assortative
Matching in Rural Ethiopia.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 53(2), pp.
347-380.
[30] Falk, Ursula Adler and Gerhard Falk (2002). Grandparents: A New Look at the Supporting
Generation. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
[31] Ferrie, Joseph P. and Jason Long (2017). “Grandfathers Matter(ed): Occupational Mo-
bility Across Three Generations in the U.S. and Britain, 1850-1910.” Working Paper.
31
[32] Ferrie, Joseph P., Catherine Massey and Jonathan Rothbaum (2016). “Do Grandpar-
ents and Great-grandparents Matter? Multigenerational Mobility in the US, 1910-2013,”
NBER Working paper No. 22635 (September).
[33] Fisman, Raymond; Sheena S. Iyengar; Emir Kamenica and Itamar Simonson. (2006)
“Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence from a Speed Dating Experiment.”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), pp. 673-697.
[34] Fryer, Roland G. and Steven D. Levitt (2004). “The Causes and Consequences of Dis-
tinctively Black Names.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 119(3): 767-805.
[35] Geddes, Rick and Dean Lueck. “The Gains from Self-Ownership and the Expansion of
Women’s Rights.” American Economic Review. 92(4): 1079-1092.
[36] Godoy, Richard, Victoria Reyes-Garcia, Thomas McDade, Susan Tanner, William R.
Leonard, Tomas Huanca, Vincent Vadez, Karishma Patel. 2006. “Why do mothers favor
girls and fathers, boys? A hypothesis and a test of investment disparity,” Human Nature,
17(2):169-189.
[37] Green, Elna (1997). Southern Strategies: Southern Women and the Woman Suffrage
Question. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
[38] Gu¨ell, Maia, Jose´ V. Rodr´ıguez-Mora, and Christopher I.Telmer (2015). “The Informa-
tional Content of Surnames, the Evolution of Intergenerational Mobility and Assortative
Mating.” Review of Economic Studies, 82(2): 693-735.
[39] Hellerstein, Judith K. and Melinda Sandler Morrill (2011). ?Dads and Daughters: The
Changing Impact of Fathers on Women?s Occupational Choices,? Journal of Human
Resources, 46(2): 333-372.
[40] Hilger, Nathaniel G. (2016). “The Great Escape: Intergenerational Mobility in the United
States Since 1940.” Mimeo., Brown University.
[41] Hurlbert, Jeanne S. (1988). “The Southern Region: A Test of the Hypothesis of Cultural
Distinctiveness.” The Sociological Quarterly. 30(2): 245-266.
32
[42] Inoue, Atsushi and Gary Solon (2010). “Two-sample Instrumental Variables Estimators.”
Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(3), pp. 557-561.
[43] Kahn, B. Zorina (1996). “Married Women’s Property Laws and Female Commercial Ac-
tivity: Evidence from United States Patent Records.” Journal of Economic History. 56(2):
356-388.
[44] Keller, Heidi (2002) “Gender and Birth Order as Determinants of Parental Behavior.”
International Journal of Behavioral Development 26: 177-184.
[45] Kim, Sukkoo and Robert A. Margo (2004). “Historical Perspectives on U.S. Economic
Geography.” In Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, Eds. J.V. Henderson and
J.F. Thisse, Ed. 1, Vol. 4, Ch. 66, pp 2981-3019.
[46] Kroeger, Sarah and Owen Thompson (2016). “Educational mobility across Three Gener-
ations of American Women.” Economics of Education Review, 53, pp. 72-86.
[47] Laibson, David I. (1997). “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112(2), pp. 443-477.
[48] Lamb, Michael E., ed. (2004). The role of the father in child development. John Wiley
and Sons.
[49] Lindahl, Mikael; Marten P˚alme; Sophia Sandgren Massih and Anna Sjo¨gren. (2015).
“Long-Term Intergenerational Persistence of Human Capital: An Empirical Analysis of
Four Generations.” Journal of Human Resources, 50 (1), pp. 1-33 (Winter).
[50] Macoby, Eleanor E. and Carol N. Jacklin (1974). The Psychology of Sex Differences.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
[51] Mailath, George J. and Andrew Postlewaite (1996). “Social Assets.” International Eco-
nomic Review, 47(4), pp. 1057-1091.
[52] Mare, Robert D. (2011). “A Multigenerational View of Inequality.” Demography. 48: 1-23.
[53] Modin, B., R. Erikson and D Vagero (2013). “Intergenerational continuity in school per-
formance: Do grandparents matter?” European Sociological Review 29:858-870
33
[54] O’Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin (1999). “Doing It Now or Later.” American Eco-
nomic Review, 89(1), pp. 103-124.
[55] Olivetti, Claudia and M. Daniele Paserman (2015). “In the Name of the Son (and the
Daughter): Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 1850-1940.” American Eco-
nomic Review, 105(8), pp. 2695-2724.
[56] Olivetti, Claudia, M. Daniele Paserman and Laura Salisbury (2018). Intergenerational
Mobility across Multiple Generations in the United States, 1850-1940. Ann Arbor, MI:
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2018-07-03.
http://doi.org/10.3886/E104521V1.
[57] Parman, John (2011). “American Mobility and the Expansion of Public Education.”
Journal of Economic History. 71(0): 105-132.
[58] Phelps, Edmund S. and Robert A. Pollak (1968). “On Second-Best National Saving and
Game-Equilibrium Growth.” Review of Economic Studies, 35(2), pp. 185-199.
[59] Preston, Samuel H. and Michael R. Haines (1991). Fatal Years: Child Mortality in Late
Nineteenth Century America, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
[60] Posadas, Josefina and Marian Vidal-Fernandez (2013). “Grandparents’ Childcare and
Female Labor Force Participation.” IZA Journal of Labor Policy. 2:14.
[61] Rice, T.W. and D. L. Coates (1995). “Gender Role Attitudes in the Southern United
States.” Gender and Society. 9: 738-750.
[62] Rosenzweig, Mark R. and Oded Stark (1989). “Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and
Marriage: Evidence from Rural India.” Journal of Political Economy, 97(4), pp. 905-926.
[63] Ruggles, Steven J.; Trent Alexander; Katie Genadek; Ronald Goeken; Matthew B.
Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek (2010). Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version
5.0 [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
[64] Scott, A.F. (1970). The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics, 1830 to 1930. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
34
[65] Shammas, Carole, Marylynn Salmon and Michel Dahlin (1987). Inheritance in America.
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
[66] Siow, Aloysius (1998). “Differential Fecundity, Markets, and Gender Roles,” Journal of
Political Economy, vol. 106(2), pp. 334-354.
[67] Solon, Gary R. (1999). “Intergenerational Mobility in the Labour Market,” in (O. Ashen-
felter and D. Card, eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3A, pp. 1761-800, Am-
sterdam: North-Holland.
[68] Solon, Gary R. (2014) . “Theoretical Models of Inequality Transmission Across Multiple
Generations.” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility, Vol. 35 (March), pp. 13-18.
[69] Solon, Gary R. (2015). “What Do We Know So Far about Multigenerational Mobility.”
NBER Working Paper No. 21053 (March).
[70] Staiger, Douglas and James H. Stock (1997). “Instrumental Variables Regression with
Weak Instruments.” Econometrica, 65(3): 557-586.
[71] Thomas, Duncan (1994). “Like Father, like Son; Like Mother, like Daughter: Parental
Resources and Child Height.” Journal of Human Resources. 29(4): 950-988.
[72] Warren, John and Robert M. Hauser (1997). “Social Stratification across Three Gener-
ations: New Evidence from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study.” American Sociological
Review, 62(4), pp. 561-572.
[73] Weinberg, M. Katherine, Tronick, Edward Z., and Cohn, Jeffrey F. (1999). “Gender
Differences in Emotional Expressivity and Self-Regulation during Early Infancy.” Devel-
opmental Psychology 35 (1): 175-188.
[74] Zeng, Zhen and Yu Xie (2014). “The Effects of Grandparents on Children’s Schooling:
Evidence from Rural China.” Demography. 51(2): 599-617.
35
7 Tables and Figures
Table 1: Grandsons and Paternal Grandfathers
Right hand side variable: Log occupational income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1860-1880-1900 1850-1880-1910
Panel A: Linked data. Occupational Income: G2 actual, G1 imputed
G1 Paternal 0.2417 0.0829 0.1689 0.0933
(0.067) (0.064) (0.047) (0.043)
G2 0.5268 0.5237 0.4233 0.4208
(0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant 1.3619 2.1940 1.1289 1.8495 2.6031 1.5846
(0.069) (0.196) (0.185) (0.057) (0.137) (0.130)
Observations 2,763 2,763 2,763 4,007 4,007 4,007
Panel B. 1% sample. Occupational income: G2 and G1 both imputed
G1 Paternal 0.6022 0.2568 0.2918 0.1152
(0.101) (0.097) (0.089) (0.072)
G2 0.2905 0.2679 0.3010 0.2918
(0.035) (0.037) (0.031) (0.032)
Constant 2.1354 1.2434 1.4582 2.2116 2.2560 1.9047
(0.102) (0.292) (0.260) (0.092) (0.257) (0.211)
Observations 77,883 77,902 77,878 82,060 82,070 82,055
Notes. Panel A displays results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupa-
tional score on G2 log occupational score and G1 log occupational score, imputed
as the average G1 log occupational score for each G2 individual’s first name. G3
and G2 data come from the IPUMS linked representative samples from 1880-1900
or 1880-1910; G1 data comes from the 1860 or 1850 IPUMS 1% sample. Panel
B displays results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupational score
on G1 and G2 log occupational score, imputed as the average G1 and G2 log
occupational score for each G3 individual’s first name. All data come from the
IPUMS 1% samples for 1850,1860, 1880, 1900 and 1910. In columns (1)-(3), the
G3 sample consists of men age 20-35 in 1900; the G2 sample consists of men age
20-35 in 1880 who have children ages 0-15; the G1 sample consists of men in 1860
who have children ages 0-15. In columns (4)-(6), the samples are constructed
similarly, using 30-45 year olds in the 1850, 1880, and 1910 censuses.
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Table 2: Grandsons and Paternal Grandfathers
Right hand side variable: Percentile rank of log occupational income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1860-1880-1900 1850-1880-1910
Panel A: Linked data. Occupational Income: G2 actual, G1 imputed
G1 Paternal 0.1524 0.0300 0.1619 0.0710
(0.042) (0.043) (0.037) (0.035)
G2 0.4273 0.4183 0.3682 0.3469
(0.041) (0.044) (0.038) (0.040)
Constant 2.6519 2.8090 2.6394 2.8845 2.9984 2.8540
(0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.024) (0.023) (0.026)
Observations 2,763 2,763 2,763 4,007 4,007 4,007
Panel B. 1% samples. Occupational income: G2 and G1 both imputed
G1 Paternal 0.1517 0.0690 0.1286 0.0534
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
G2 0.2558 0.2185 0.2650 0.2376
(0.027) (0.030) (0.025) (0.027)
Constant 2.8396 2.8978 2.8204 2.9456 3.0264 2.9301
(0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 77,883 77,902 77,878 82,060 82,070 82,055
Notes. Panel A displays results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log oc-
cupational score on percentile ranks of G2 log occupational score and G1 log
occupational score, imputed as the average G1 log occupational score for each G2
individual’s first name. G3 and G2 data come from the IPUMS linked representa-
tive samples from 1880-1900 or 1880-1910; G1 data comes from the 1860 or 1850
IPUMS 1% sample. Panel B displays results from OLS regressions of individual
G3 log occupational score on percentile ranks of log occupational scores for G2
and G1 (both imputed). For details on data sources and sample restrictions, see
note to Table 1.
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Table 3: Intergenerational Elasticities Across Three Generations:
Regressions at 20 Year Intervals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1860-1880-1900 1880-1900-1920 1900-1920-1940
Panel A: G3 Male
G1 Paternal 0.0690 - 0.0967 - 0.1391 -
(0.022) (0.020) (0.018)
G1 Maternal - 0.0106 - 0.0566 - 0.1205
(0.024) (0.021) (0.017)
G2 0.2185 0.2659 0.3300 0.3642 0.2610 0.2849
(0.030) (0.028) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019)
Constant 2.8204 2.8271 2.8172 2.8163 2.8400 2.8301
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 77,878 78,634 106,019 107,047 116,210 117,269
Panel B: G3 Female
G1 Paternal 0.0891 - 0.0613 - 0.0703 -
(0.020) (0.019) (0.016)
G1 Maternal - 0.0661 - 0.0944 - 0.1033
(0.024) (0.020) (0.015)
G2 0.2680 0.3057 0.3642 0.3602 0.2882 0.2705
(0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.015)
Constant 2.8492 2.8333 2.8995 2.8772 2.9686 2.9545
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008)
Observations 44,292 44,930 66,324 67,204 74,857 75,633
Notes. Contains results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupational score on the
percentile rank of imputed G2 and G1 log occupational score, imputed as the average G2 or
G1 log occupational score for each G3 individual’s first name. For women, log occupational
score is measured as the log occupational score of her husband. Panel A reports the results
for G3 males using our three samples constructed at 20 year intervals, and panel B reports
similar results for G3 females. The G3 sample consists of adults age 20-35 in the third sample
year (1900, 1920 or 1940); the G2 sample consists of adults age 20-35 in the second sample
year (1880, 1900 or 1920) who have children ages 0-15; the G1 sample consists of men in
the first sample year (1850, 1880 or 1900) who have children ages 0-15. Standard errors are
clustered by G3 individual’s first name.
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Table 4: Summary of G1-G3 Intergenerational Income Elasticities using Different Sample
Restrictions and Wage Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Intergenerational income elasticity: G1-G3
All G3 G3 G1 G1
Male Female Paternal Maternal
G1 Paternal 0.0054 0.0334*** -0.0226**
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008)
G3 Male 0.0153* 0.0433*** -0.0127
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Second sample (G3=1920 or 1910) 0.0169* 0.0221*** 0.0117 0.0196* 0.0142
(0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Third sample (G3=1940) 0.0236** 0.0408*** 0.0064 0.0259** 0.0213*
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Interval = 30 years -0.0284*** -0.0306*** -0.0261*** -0.0319*** -0.0248**
(0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Specification details:
G2 spouse in same age bracket -0.0048** -0.0028 -0.0068** -0.0041 -0.0055*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
G3 married 0.0092** 0.0184** 0.0063 0.0121*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
G3 spouse in same age bracket 0.0086** 0.0154** 0.0018 0.0069* 0.0103
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
Constant 0.0608*** 0.0495*** 0.0875*** 0.0535*** 0.0735***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Observations 144 72 72 72 72
Notes The dependent variable in each of these regressions is our estimated G1-G3 intergenerational elasticity under
different specifications. All G1-G3 elasticities are taken from OLS regressions of G3 log occupational score on the
percentile rank of imputed scores of G2 and G1 (see Tables 2 and 3 for additional details). These elasticities are
estimated for combinations of 2 G2 genders , 2 G3 genders, 3 sample periods, and 2 intervals at which samples are
constructed (20 or 30 years), 2 sample restrictions on G2 (baseline, or both spouses in the same age bracket), and
3 sample restrictions on G3 (baseline, married, or married and both spouses in the same age bracket). Column (1)
contains elasticities from all specifications (2×2×3×2×2×3 = 144 total); the remaining columns contain elasticities
for a single G2 or G3 gender. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Intergenerational Elasticities Across Three Generations:
Percentile Rank Regressions with Paternal and Maternal Grandfathers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
20-year intervals 30-year intervals
G3 Male G3 Female G3 Male G3 Female
G1 paternal 0.0981*** 0.0478*** 0.0688*** 0.0229**
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
G1 maternal 0.0267** 0.0716*** 0.0162 0.0537***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
G2 0.2551*** 0.2739*** 0.2597*** 0.3016***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 298,426 184,468 300,019 219,214
p (G1 paternal = G1 maternal) 0.001 0.167 0.002 0.081
p (G1 pat [G3 male] = G1 pat [G3 female]) 0.002 0.0034
p (G1 mat [G3 male] = G1 mat [G3 female]) 0.012 0.026
Notes Contains results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupational score on the percentile rank of imputed
scores of G2, paternal G1 and maternal G1; these are imputed as the average for each G3 individual’s first name. For
women, log occupational score is measured as the log occupational score of her husband. Columns (1) and (2) pool
our three samples constructed at 20 year intervals, including decade controls; columns (3) and (4) pool our samples
constructed at 30 year intervals. The G3 sample consists of adults age 20-35 (or 30-45) in the third sample year; the
G2 sample consists of adults age 20-35 (or 30-45) in the second sample year, who have children ages 0-15 and are
married to spouse in the same age bracket; the G1 sample consists of men in the first sample year who have children
ages 0-15. Standard errors are clustered by G3 first name - decade groups.
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Table 6: Intergenerational Mobility Across Three Generations
Alternative Occupational Wage Measures, Regressions at 20-year Intervals
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1900 occ. wages Wealth-based occ. wages
G3 Male G3 Female G3 Male G3 Female
G1 paternal 0.0627*** 0.0495*** 0.1533*** 0.1074***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.027) (0.028)
G1 maternal 0.0308*** 0.0601*** 0.1143*** 0.1409***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.026) (0.025)
G2 0.1996*** 0.1965*** 0.2518*** 0.3054***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.023) (0.022)
Observations 304,261 184,924 280,461 177,079
p (G1 paternal = G1 maternal) 0.060 0.460 0.361 0.381
p (G1 pat [G3 male] = G1 pat [G3 female]) 0.356 0.236
p (G1 mat [G3 male] = G1 mat [G3 female]) 0.049 0.463
Notes Contains results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupational score on the percentile rank of imputed
scores of G2, paternal G1 and maternal G1; these are imputed as the average for each G3 individual’s first name.
For women, log occupational score is measured as the log occupational score of her husband. All columns pool our
three samples constructed at 20 year intervals, including decade controls. Columns (1) and (2) measure occupational
income using the 1900 wage distribution with an imputed wage for farmers (Preston and Haines 1991; Abramitzky et
al 2012; Olivetti and Paserman 2013). Columns (3) and (4) measure occupational income using mean personal wealth
by occupation in 1860 and 1870, adjusting the wealth of farmers downward by the average value of farm equipment
and livestock (values from Haines and ICPSR 2010). The G3 sample consists of adults age 20-35 in the third sample
year; the G2 sample consists of adults age 20-35 in the second sample year, who have children ages 0-15 and are
married to spouse in the same age bracket; the G1 sample consists of men in the first sample year who have children
ages 0-15. Standard errors are clustered by G3 first name - decade groups.
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Table 7: Intergenerational Elasticities Across Three Generations:
Percentile Rank Regressions with Paternal and Maternal Grandfathers by Region, Regressions at 20-year Intervals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Northeast Midwest South
G3 Male G3 Female G3 Male G3 Female G3 Male G3 Female
G1 paternal 0.0548*** 0.0272** 0.0311** 0.0195 0.0772*** 0.0467***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
G1 maternal 0.0110 0.0067 0.0239 0.0260** 0.0304* 0.1082***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.016)
G2 0.0749*** 0.1028*** 0.1939*** 0.1821*** 0.1817*** 0.2233***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 86,627 49,380 103,555 64,944 68,105 45,941
p (G1 paternal = G1 maternal) 0.017 0.234 0.749 0.723 0.056 0.008
p (G1 pat [G3 male] = G1 pat [G3 female]) 0.11 0.544 0.180
p (G1 mat [G3 male] = G1 mat [G3 female]) 0.795 0.918 0.001
Notes. Contains results from OLS regressions of individual G3 log occupational score on the percentile rank of imputed scores of G2, paternal
G1 and maternal G1; these are imputed as the average for each G3 individual’s first name. For women, log occupational score is measured
as the log occupational score of her husband. All columns pool our three samples constructed at 20 year intervals, including decade controls.
Columns (1) and (2) restrict the sample to individuals residing in the Northeast; columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to individuals residing
in the Midwest; columns (5) and (6) restrict the sample to individuals residing in the South. The G3 sample consists of adults age 20-35 in
the third sample year; the G2 sample consists of adults age 20-35 in the second sample year, who have children ages 0-15 and are married
to spouse in the same age bracket; the G1 sample consists of men in the first sample year who have children ages 0-15. Standard errors are
clustered by G3 first name - decade groups.
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